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Abstract. Based on the Bressan and Shen approach (Bressan and Shen, 2004; Shen, 2009), we
present an extension of the class of non-zero sum differential games for which value functions
are described by a weakly hyperbolic Hamilton–Jacobi system. The considered value functions
are determined by a Pareto optimality condition for instantaneous gain functions, for which
we compare two methods of the unique choice Pareto optimal strategies. We present the
procedure of applying this approach for duopoly.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Dynamic models describe situations in which two or more players make their decisions
about their own behavior under the same circumstances. In this paper, we shall consider
games with a finite duration of time. We shall be interested in solving theoretical
maximizing problems that can be applied to finding better strategies in models of
duopoly. Our effort is focused on finding a better solution than the Nash equilibrium.
On the one hand, we want the solution to provide greater payoffs for both players,
but also we want to obtain a well-posed system of PDEs describing value functions.
We assume that the evolution of state is described by the following differential
equation:
x˙ = f(x) + φ(x)u1 +ψ(x)u2 (1)
with initial data:
x(τ) = y ∈ Rm (2)
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where f : Rm → Rm, φ, ψ : Rm → Mm×n(R) and ui are feedback strategies – they
depend on time t and state x(t), (i = 1, 2). The goal of the i-th player is to maximize
his payoff function; i.e.,
Ji(τ, y, u1, u2) = gi(x(T ))−
T∫
τ
hi(x(t), ui(t))dt (3)
where
a terminal payoff gi : Rm → R is a non negative and smooth function (4)
and
a running cost hi : Rm × Rn → R is a smooth function such that
hi(x, ·) is strictly convex for every x ∈ Rm (5)
We consider the instantaneous gain functions:
Y1(x, p1, p2, u1, u2) = p1 · F (x, u1, u2)− h1(x, u1)
Y2(x, p1, p2, u1, u2) = p2 · F (x, u1, u2)− h2(x, u2)
(6)
where F (x, u1, u2) is the right side of the dynamic and the dot denotes the scalar
product (in (1), we have F (x, u1, u2) = f(x)+φ(x)u1+ψ(x)u2). Fixing x, p1, p2 ∈ Rm
and s > 0, we can find Pareto optimal1 choices UPi (x, p1, p2, s) for the static game
Yi(x, p1, p2, ·, ·), i = 1, 2, in the following way: if (uP1 , uP2 ) is the maximum of the
combined payoff Ys = sY1+Y2, then the strategies (uP1 , uP2 ) give Pareto optimal payoffs
in game (Y1, Y2). As a result, strategies UPi depend on s. We choose a smooth function
s(x, p1, p2) and define feedback strategies Usi (x, p1, p2) = UPi (x, p1, p2, s(x, p1, p2)) for
the problem (1)–(3). Such strategies are called semi-cooperative (Bressan and Shen,
2004). If functions:
V si (τ, y) = Ji(τ, y, U
s
1 , U
s
2 )
are smooth enough, then they satisfy the following system:{
V1,t +H1(x,∇xV1,∇xV2) = 0
V2,t +H2(x,∇xV1,∇xV2) = 0
(7)
with the terminal data:
V1(T, x) = g1(x) and V2(T, x) = g2(x) (8)
where the Hamiltonian functions are given by:
Hi(x, p1, p2) = Yi(x, p1, p2, U
s
1 (x, p1, p2), U
s
2 (x, p1, p2))
and they depend on s. Functions V si are usually called the value functions.
1 We say that (uP1 , u
P
2 ) is a pair of Pareto optimal choices for the game, which is given by
payoff functions Yi(u1, u2) (i = 1, 2), if there exists no pair (u1, u2) such that Y1(u1, u2) >
Y1(uP1 , u
P
2 ) and Y2(u1, u2) > Y2(u
P
1 , u
P
2 ). This means that no pair of admissible strategies exists
that improve both payoffs simultaneously.
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In Section 2, we shall prove that system (7) is weakly hyperbolic and is hyperbolic
except for some curves on the (p1, p2)-plane (see Theorem 2.1). If the system is
hyperbolic, then it is well-posed and this fact is crucial for numerical solutions (for
more details, see (Serre, 2000)). This result is a generalization of Theorem 3 from
(Bressan and Shen, 2004). In that paper, it is shown that, if we consider the dynamic:
x˙ = f(x) + u1 + u2, (9)
then system (7) is weakly hyperbolic and is hyperbolic except some curves on the
(p1, p2)-plane.
In Section 3, we compare two methods of stating a Pareto optimum for functionals
(Y1, Y2). In both cases, the referential point is a Nash equilibrium payoff (Y N1 , Y N2 ), and
we require Pareto optimal outcomes to be greater than those for the Nash equilibrium:
Y Pi > Y Ni for i = 1, 2
Obviously, the above criterion does not determine Pareto optimal strategies uniquely.
Bressan and Shen (2004) receive the uniqueness of Pareto optimal choices by using
the following condition:
Y P1 − Y N1 = Y P2 − Y N2
The second criterion of choosing Pareto optimal strategies is based on the concept of
the Nash solution to the bargaining problem (see (Nash, 1950)). The pair (Y˜ P1 , Y˜ P2 ) is
such a solution if:
(Y˜ P1 − Y N1 )(Y˜ P2 − Y N2 ) > (Y P1 − Y N1 )(Y P2 − Y N2 ) for every (Y P1 , Y P2 ).
The above condition can be reformulated using function s:
s(x, p1, p2) = arg max
s>0
{(Y P1 (s)− Y N1 )(Y P2 (s)− Y N2 )}
The main advantage of the second approach is that, considering the dynamics such as
the Lanchester duopoly model used in (Chintagunta and Vilcassim, 1992) and (Wang
and Wu, 2001) in which the dynamic is given by the equation:
x˙ = u1(1− x)− u2x (10)
and the duopoly model from (Bressan and Shen, 2004) given by the formula:
x˙ = x(1− x)(u1 − u2) (11)
it is possible to compute function s analytically, as we shall study in Section 3, and
determine the system (7) effectively. In view of Theorem 2.1, the obtained systems are
hyperbolic except for some curves on the (p1, p2)-plane.
A natural consequence of the above result should be solving numerically received
systems and using them to construct semi-cooperative strategies for empirical examples
of a duopoly. Unfortunately, we have no ready algorithms for such problems at the
moment. Although, the situation seems not to be hopeless. Hamilton–Jacobi systems
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can be transformed into systems of conservation laws, and for such problems, there
exist numerical algorithms. For now, a numerical solvability will not be the subject of
this paper.
The Nash equilibrium is the most common approach to the problem of maximizing
payoff (3) for the dynamic given by (1) and (2). As Bressan and Shen (2004) show, in
general, such an approach leads to unstable systems of partial differential equations.
Therefore, we shall use a Pareto optimality condition. Moreover, our result is not
only a theoretical generalization of the Bressan and Shen dynamic, because (9) is
not sufficient for empirical research. Let us notice that duopoly models (10) and (11)
are not of the (9) form, but they are of the (1) form.
2. PARETO OPTIMAL CHOICES – THE MAIN RESULT
First, we recall the basic definitions and facts concerning the hyperbolicity of linear
and nonlinear systems of PDEs. One can find details in (Bressan and Shen, 2004;
Serre, 2000).
We consider a linear system on Rm with constant coefficients:
Vt +
m∑
α=1
AαVxα = 0 (12)
where t is time, x ∈ Rm, V : R× Rm → Rk. Let us notice that k corresponds to the
number of players in a game and m is the dimension of the state space. We define the
linear combination:
A(ξ) =
m∑
α=1
ξαAα
where ξ ∈ Rm.
Definition 2.1. System (12) is hyperbolic if there exists a constant C such that
sup
ξ∈IRm
|| exp iA(ξ)|| 6 C
where:
exp iA(ξ) =
∞∑
n=0
(iA(ξ))n
n!
Definition 2.2. System (12) is weakly hyperbolic, if for every ξ ∈ Rm, the matrix
A(ξ) has k real eigenvalues λ1(ξ), . . . , λk(ξ).
In (Bressan and Shen, 2004), it is shown that the initial value problem for system
(12) is well-posed in L2(Rm) if and only if the system is hyperbolic. We have the
following necessary condition of hyperbolicity.
Lemma 2.1. If system (12) is hyperbolic, then it is weakly hyperbolic.
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The next result refers to the one-dimensional case, when system (12) takes the
form:
Vt +AVx = 0 (13)
Lemma 2.2. System (13) is hyperbolic if and only if the matrix A admits a basis of
real eigenvectors.
It is also easy to see that the following statement is true.
Remark 1. Let A ∈ M2×2(R). The matrix A has two real eigenvalues if and only if
(A11 − A22)2 + 4A12A21 > 0. Moreover, if (A11 − A22)2 + 4A12A21 > 0, then the
eigenvectors span the space R2.
In view of Lemma 2.1, it is reasonable to check the weak hyperbolicity in the first
place. We mainly receive nonlinear systems, so it is necessary to understand what the
hyperbolicity means in this case. Consider the system of Hamilton–Jacobi equations:
(Vi)t +Hi(x, (V1)x, . . . , (Vk)x) = 0 i = 1, . . . , k (14)
The linearization of (14) takes the following form:
(Vi)t +
∑
j,α
[
∂Hi
∂pjα
(x, p1, p2, . . . , pk)
]
· ∂Vj
∂xα
= 0 i = 1, . . . , k (15)
where (x, p1, p2, . . . , pk) ∈ R(1+k)m and pi = (Vi)x. If we denote:
(Aα)ij :=
∂Hi
∂pjα
(x, p1, p2, . . . , pk) (16)
then equations (15) are of the (12) form.
Definition 2.3. The nonlinear system (14) is hyperbolic (weakly hyperbolic) on the
domain Ω ∈ R(1+k)m, if for every (x, p1, p2, . . . , pk) ∈ Ω its linearisation (15) is
hyperbolic (weakly hyperbolic).
Due to the fact that we are interested in solving empirical problems in a duopoly
and applying numerical methods, we need to know that our systems have a unique
solution, and this solution’s behavior changes continuously with the initial conditions.
For this reason, hyperbolicity is crucial.
Our aim is to study the hyperbolicity of a system of Hamilton–Jacobi equations
describing value functions generated by a Pareto optimality condition for instantaneous
gain functions. The evolution of the state is described by (1) with the initial data given
by (2). The goal of the i-th player (i = 1, 2) is to maximize his payoff function (3),
where gi and hi satisfy the assumptions (4), (5). We shall consider instantaneous gain
functions:
Y1(x, p1, p2, u1, u2) = p1 · (f(x) + φ(x)u1 + ψ(x)u2)− h1(x, u1)
Y2(x, p1, p2, u1, u2) = p2 · (f(x) + φ(x)u1 + ψ(x)u2)− h2(x, u2)
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Fixing x, p1, p2 ∈ Rm and s > 0, we can find Pareto optimal choices UPi (x, p1, p2, s) for
static game Yi(x, p1, p2, ·, ·), i = 1, 2, in the following way: if (uP1 , uP2 ) is the maximum
of function Ys = sY1 + Y2, then strategies (uP1 , uP2 ) give Pareto optimal payoffs in
game (Y1, Y2). This is the reason why strategies UPi depend on s. We choose a smooth
function s(x, p1, p2) and define the semi-cooperative feedback strategies:
Usi (x, p1, p2) = U
P
i (x, p1, p2, s(x, p1, p2)) i = 1, 2 (17)
We define the Hamiltonian functions as follows:
H1(x, p1, p2) = Y1(x, p1, p2, U
s
1 (x, p1, p2), U
s
2 (x, p1, p2))
H2(x, p1, p2) = Y2(x, p1, p2, U
s
1 (x, p1, p2), U
s
2 (x, p1, p2))
If value functions:
V si (τ, y) = Ji(τ, y, U
s
1 , U
s
2 ) i = 1, 2
are smooth, then they satisfy the system of Hamilton–Jacobi equations:{
V1,t +H1(x,∇xV1,∇xV2) = 0
V2,t +H2(x,∇xV1,∇xV2) = 0
(18)
Theorem 2.1. Consider problem (1)–(5). As gradients (p1, p2) of the value functions
range in open region Ω ⊂ R2m, assume that the players adopt Pareto optimal strategies
of form (17) for some smooth function s = s(x, p1, p2). Then, system (18) is weakly
hyperbolic on domain Ω. Moreover, if we consider one-dimension case (m = 1),
system (18) is hyperbolic except for some curves on the (p1, p2)-plane.
The method of proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 3 in (Bressan and
Shen, 2004).
Proof. We define functions ki : Rm → Rn – i = 1, 2 as follows:
k1(ξ) = k1(ξ, v, x) = arg max
ω∈Rn
{ξ(f(x) + φ(x)ω + ψ(x)v)− h1(x, ω)}
and:
k2(ξ) = k2(ξ, v, x) = arg max
ω∈Rn
{ξ(f(x) + φ(x)v + ψ(x)ω)− h2(x, ω)}
where x ∈ Rm and v ∈ Rn. Since h1, h2 are smooth functions that satisfy (5), one can
observe that
∂h1
∂u1
(x, k1(ξ)) = ξφ(x) and
∂h2
∂u2
(x, k2(ξ)) = ξψ(x) (19)
We seek Pareto optimal choices by maximizing function Ys = sY1 +Y2. In view of (19),
we can formulate Pareto optimal strategies using functions k1 and k2:
uP1 (x, p1, p2, s) = k1(p1 +
p2
s
) and uP2 (x, p1, p2, s) = k2(sp1 + p2) (20)
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The necessary condition for a local maximum implies that:
s
∂Y1
∂u1
+
∂Y2
∂u1
= s
∂Y1
∂u2
+
∂Y2
∂u2
= 0 (21)
Denoting:
Y Pi = Yi(x, p1, p2, u
P
1 (x, p1, p2, s), u
P
2 (x, p1, p2, s)) i = 1, 2
and recalling (21), we obtain the following equality:
∂Y P1
∂s
= −1
s
∂Y P2
∂s
(22)
Now, we compute the linearization of system (18). From (20), we get:
Y P1 = p1
(
f(x) + φ(x)k1
(
p1 +
p2
s
)
+ ψ(x)k2(sp1 + p2)
)
− h1
(
x, k1
(
p1 +
p2
s
))
Y P2 = p2
(
f(x) + φ(x)k1
(
p1 +
p2
s
)
+ ψ(x)k2(sp1 + p2)
)
− h2(x, k2(sp1 + p2))
To clarify further computations, let us temporarily assume that m = n = 1 and
that s = const. The linearization takes the following form:[
f + φk1 + ψk2 + p1(φk
′
1 + sψk
′
2)− h′1k′1 p1( 1sφk′1 + ψk′2)− 1sh′1k′1
p2(φk
′
1 + sψk
′
2)− sh′2k′2 f + φk1 + ψk2 + p2( 1sφk′1 + ψk′2)− h′2k′2
]
(23)
where:
h′1 =
∂h1
∂u1
and h′2 =
∂h2
∂u2
Let a := ψp1k′2 − 1s2φp2k′1. We can write matrix (23) as follows:
A :=
[
f + φk1 + ψk2 + sa a
−s2a f + φk1 + ψk2 − sa
]
= (f + φk1 + ψk2)I +A
]
where:
I =
[
1 0
0 1
]
and A] =
[
sa a
−s2a −sa
]
In view of Remark 1, it is obvious that A is weakly hyperbolic.
Now let s = s(x, p1, p2). In this situation, the linearization matrix is the following:
A = (f + φk1 + ψk2)I +A
] +A[
where:
A[ =
 ∂Y
P
1
∂s
∂s
∂p1
∂Y P1
∂s
∂s
∂p2
∂Y P2
∂s
∂s
∂p1
∂Y P2
∂s
∂s
∂p2

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Using (22) and denoting c := ∂Y
P
1
∂s
∂s
∂p1
, d := ∂Y
P
1
∂s
∂s
∂p2
, we obtain:
A[ =
[
c d
−sc −sd
]
From Remark 1, it is easy to verify that matrix A has two real eigenvalues: λ1 =
f +φk1 +ψk2 and λ2 = f +φk1 +ψk2 + c− sd; thus, the system is weakly hyperbolic.
Furthermore, the system is hyperbolic when c 6= sd and pi 6= 0 for i = 1, 2.
Now let m,n ∈ N. We need to verify if matrix:
A(ξ) =
m∑
α=1
ξαAα
is weakly hyperbolic where, as in (16),
Aα =
[
∂Hi
∂pjα
(x, p1, p2)
]2
i,j=1
Repeating the reasoning for α’s coordinate of p1 and p2, we receive:
Aα = (fα + (φk1)α + (ψk2)α)I +A
]
α +A
[
α
where:
A]α =
[
saα aα
−saα −saα
]
, A[α =
[
cα dα
−scα −sdα
]
and aα = ψ(Dk2 · p1)α − 1s2φ(Dk1 · p2)α, cα = ∂Y
P
1
∂s
∂s
∂p1α
, dα =
∂Y P1
∂s
∂s
∂p2α
. This means
that matrix A(ξ) has the following form:
A(ξ) =
m∑
α=1
ξαAα = (ξ · f + ξ · φk1 + ξ · ψk2)I +A](ξ) +A[(ξ)
where:
A](ξ) =
[
ξ · sa ξ · a
−ξ · s2a −ξ · sa
]
, A[(ξ) =
[
ξ · c ξ · d
−ξ · sc −ξ · sd
]
Matrix A(ξ) has the two real eigenvalues:
λ1(ξ) = ξ · (f + φk1 + ψk2) and λ2(ξ) = ξ · (f + φk1 + ψk2 + c− sd).
Remark 2. If s is constant, then our problem becomes a cooperative game, and
there is no guarantee that Pareto optimal payoffs dominate Nash payoffs. Such
dominance is crucial for our considerations, because we want to improve outcomes in
a reasonable way.
Hyperbolicity of Systems Describing Value Functions . . . 97
3. THE UNIQUENESS OF THE PARETO OPTIMAL CHOICES
The choice of Pareto optimal strategies is a very important issue. Since Pareto optimal
outcomes are not unique, we present two meaningfully different criteria. In this section,
we compare the Bressan and Shen criterion (2004) with the criterion proposed by us,
which is based on the Nash solution to the bargaining problem. Finally, we determine
Pareto optimal solutions for two duopoly models.
Bressan and Shen formulate the choice of s basing on the fairness conditions:
Y Pi (s) > Y
N
i for i = 1, 2 (24)
and:
Y P1 (s)− Y N1 = Y P2 (s)− Y N2 (25)
Condition (24) is necessary to receive better outcomes than the Nash equilibrium ones,
and it is essential to convince players to use a Pareto optimal approach. Unfortunately,
conditions (24), (25) are not easy to apply in the examples. Accordingly, we suggest
using the Nash solution to the bargaining problem. Firstly, the choice should not make
the payoffs worse:
Y Pi (s) > Y Ni for i = 1, 2 (26)
Pair (Y˜ P1 , Y˜ P2 ) is the Nash solution to the bargaining problem if:
(Y˜ P1 − Y N1 )(Y˜ P2 − Y N2 ) > (Y P1 − Y N1 )(Y P2 − Y N2 ) for every (Y P1 , Y P2 )
In the examples, we use the following reformulated form:
s(x, p1, p2) = arg max
s>0
{(Y P1 (s)− Y N1 )(Y P2 (s)− Y N2 )} (27)
If the intersection of the image of function Y = (Y1, Y2) and set {(y1, y2) : yi > Y Ni ,
i = 1, 2} is convex, then conditions (26), (27) provide the unique s. We compare these
two approaches for two dynamics, the Lanchester duopoly model:
x˙ = u1(1− x)− u2x (28)
and the duopoly model from (Bressan and Shen, 2004):
x˙ = x(1− x)(u1 − u2) (29)
In both cases, state x ∈ [0, 1] characterizes the market share. We shall use the following
payoff function:
Ji(τ, y, u1, u2) = xi(T ) +
∫ T
τ
[
xi(t)− 1
2
u2i (t)
]
dt (30)
where x1(t) = x(t) is the market share of the first company at time t ∈ [τ, T ], while
x2(t) = 1− x(t) is the market share of the second. Both methods require comparing
new values with Nash equilibrium payoffs Y N1 , Y N2 – the instantaneous gain functions
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for Nash equilibrium strategies uN1 , uN2 . The strategies can be found from the following
conditions:
∂Y1
∂u1
= 0 and
∂Y2
∂u2
= 0 (31)
Example 1
Let us consider the Lanchester duopoly model, which is given by (28), with the payoff
function (30). The instantaneous gain functions take form:
Yi(x, p1, p2, u1, u2) = pi(u1(1− x)− u2x) + xi − 1
2
u2i i = 1, 2
where x1 = x and x2 = 1 − x. Using (31), we obtain that uN1 = p1(1 − x) and
uN2 = −p2x. The Nash payoffs are the following:
Y N1 = Y1(x, p1, p2, u
N
1 , u
N
2 ) =
1
2
p21(1− x)2 + p1p2x2 + x
Y N2 = Y2(x, p1, p2, u
N
1 , u
N
2 ) =
1
2
p22x
2 + p1p2(1− x)2 + 1− x
Now, we find the set of Pareto optimal choices. We maximize function Ys = sY1 + Y2:
Ys(x, p1, p2, u1, u2) = sp1(u1(1−x)−u2x)+sx−s1
2
u21+p2(u1(1−x)−u2x)+1−x−
1
2
u22.
Using necessary condition:
∂Ys
∂u1
= 0 and
∂Ys
∂u2
= 0 (32)
we receive uP1 = (p1 +
1
sp2)(1− x) and uP2 = −(sp1 + p2)x. The respective payoffs are:
Y P1 = p1
((
p1 +
1
s
p2
)
(1− x)2 + (sp1 + p2)x2
)
+ x− 1
2
(
p1 +
1
s
p2
)2
(1− x)2
Y P2 = p2
((
p1 +
1
s
p2
)
(1− x)2 + (sp1 + p2)x2
)
+ 1− x− 1
2
(
sp1 + p2
)2
x2
Firstly, we shall use fairness condition (24) and (25). Condition (25) allows us to
present function s as one of the solutions of the following equation:
(p1x)
2s4 + 2(p1x)
2s3 − 2(p2(1− x))2s− (p2(1− x))2 = 0 (33)
Unfortunately, condition (33) does not provide solutions that could be presented in
one simple, analytically computed formula. On the other hand, applying conditions
(26) and (27) we obtain that the seeking function s is given by the formula:
s(x, p1, p2) =
(
p2(1− x)
p1x
) 2
3
(34)
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The Hamilton functions for (34) are the following:
H1(x, p1, p2) =
1
2
p21 −
((
x
1− x
)2
p21p2
) 2
3
 (1− x)2 +(p1p2 + ((1− x
x
)
p21p2
) 2
3
)
x2 + x
H2(x, p1, p2) =
1
2
p22 −
((
1− x
x
)2
p1p
2
2
) 2
3
x2 +(p1p2 + (( x
1− x
)
p1p
2
2
) 2
3
)
(1− x)2 + 1− x
The matrix of the linearization of (18), in this case, takes the form:
(
p1 − 2φ
2(x)(p1p22)
1
3
3
)
(1− x)2 −φ
2(x)
(
p41p
−1
2
) 1
3
3
(1− x)2
+
(
p2 +
4(p1p22)
1
3
3φ(x)
)
x2 +
p1 + 2(p41p−12 ) 133φ(x)
x2
−
(
p−11 p
4
2
) 1
3
3φ2(x)
x2
(
p2 − 2(p
2
1p2)
1
3
3φ2(x)
)
x2
+
p2 + 2φ(x)(p−11 p42) 133
 (1− x)2 +(p1 + 4φ(x)(p21p2) 133
)
(1− x)2

p1=∇xV1,p2=∇xV2
where φ(x) =
(
x
1−x
) 2
3
.
Example 2
Let us consider the second duopoly model, which is given in (29). The payoff functions
are given in (30); thus, the instantaneous gain functions take the following form:
Yi(x, p1, p2, u1, u2) = pix(1− x)(u1 − u2) + xi − 1
2
u2i i = 1, 2
where x1 = x and x2 = 1 − x. Using (31), we obtain that uN1 = p1x(1 − x) and
uN2 = −p2x(1− x) with the Nash payoffs:
Y N1 = (x(1− x))2
(
1
2
p21 + p1p2
)
+ x, Y N2 = (x(1− x))2
(
1
2
p22 + p1p2
)
+ 1− x
Now, we need to find the set of Pareto optimal choices. To do that, we shall maximize
function Ys = sY1 + Y2, (s > 0 is fixed):
Ys(x, p1, p2, u1, u2) = sp1x(1−x)(u1−u2)+sx−s1
2
u21+p2x(1−x)(u1−u2)+1−x−
1
2
u22
Using necessary condition (32), we get uP1 =
(
p1+
1
sp2
)
x(1−x) and uP2 = −(sp1+p2)
x(1− x), and the Pareto optimal payoffs are:
Y P1 = (x(1− x))2
[(
1
2
+ s
)
p21 + p1p2 −
p22
2s2
]
+ x
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Y P2 = (x(1− x))2
[(
1
2
+
1
s
)
p22 + p1p2 −
s2p21
2
]
+ 1− x
Applying (25), we get a very similar polynomial as in Example 1:
(p1)
2s4 + 2(p1)
2s3 − 2(p2)2s− (p2)2 = 0
On the other hand, from conditions (26) and (27), we find that seeking function s is
given by the following formula:
s(x, p1, p2) =
(
p2
p1
) 2
3
(35)
The Hamilton functions for (35) are the following:
H1(x, p1, p2) = x
2(1− x)2
(
1
2
p21 + p1p2 +
1
2
(
p21p2
) 2
3
)
+ x
H2(x, p1, p2) = x
2(1− x)2
(
1
2
p22 + p1p2 +
1
2
(
p1p
2
2
) 2
3
)
+ 1− x
The linearization of the system takes the following form:
[
V1
V2
]
t
+
φ(x)
(
p1 + p2 +
2
3
(
p1p22
) 1
3
)
φ(x)
(
p1 +
1
3
(
p41p
−1
2
) 1
3
)
φ(x)
(
p2 +
1
3
(
p−11 p
4
2
) 1
3
)
φ(x)
(
p1 + p2 +
2
3
(
p21p2
) 1
3
)

p1=∇xV1,p2=∇xV2
·
[
V1
V2
]
x
=
[
0
0
]
where φ(x) = x2(1− x)2.
Criteria (26) and (27) provide an effective analytical formula describing Hamilotnian
functions H1, H2 in system (18) in both duopoly models. Our next aim is to solve the
received systems numerically and to compare the obtained solutions with empirical
data.
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